Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Automated Verification of Remote Electronic Voting Protocols in the Applied Pi-Calculus
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Accountability: definition and relationship to verifiability
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Election verifiability in electronic voting protocols
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Attacking and Fixing Helios: An Analysis of Ballot Secrecy
CSF '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Analysis of an electronic voting protocol in the applied pi calculus
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Automated verification of equivalence properties of cryptographic protocols
ESOP'12 Proceedings of the 21st European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Improving Helios with everlasting privacy towards the public
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
Distributed ElGamal à la Pedersen: Application to Helios
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
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Will my vote remain secret in 20 years? This is a natural question in the context of electronic voting, where encrypted votes may be published on a bulletin board for verifiability purposes, but the strength of the encryption is eroded with the passage of time. The question has been addressed through a property referred to as everlasting privacy. Perfect everlasting privacy may be difficult or even impossible to achieve, in particular in remote electronic elections. In this paper, we propose a definition of practical everlasting privacy. The key idea is that in the future, an attacker will be more powerful in terms of computation (he may be able to break the cryptography) but less powerful in terms of the data he can operate on (transactions between a vote client and the vote server may not have been stored). We formalize our definition of everlasting privacy in the applied-pi calculus. We provide the means to characterize what an attacker can break in the future in several cases. In particular, we model this for perfectly hiding and computationally binding primitives (or the converse), such as Pedersen commitments, and for symmetric and asymmetric encryption primitives. We adapt existing tools, in order to allow us to automatically prove everlasting privacy. As an illustration, we show that several variants of Helios (including Helios with Pedersen commitments) and a protocol by Moran and Naor achieve practical everlasting privacy, using the ProVerif and the AKiSs tools.