Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Mix and Match: Secure Function Evaluation via Ciphertexts
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Coercion-resistant electronic elections
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Advances in cryptographic voting systems
Knowledge-based modelling of voting protocols
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Automated Verification of Remote Electronic Voting Protocols in the Applied Pi-Calculus
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Specification of Electronic Voting Protocol Properties Using ADM Logic: FOO Case Study
ICICS '08 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Helios: web-based open-audit voting
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Electing a university president using open-audit voting: analysis of real-world use of Helios
EVT/WOTE'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Towards automatic analysis of election verifiability properties
ARSPA-WITS'10 Proceedings of the 2010 joint conference on Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis and issues in the theory of security
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Adapting helios for provable ballot privacy
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Measures to establish trust in internet voting
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance
Vote-independence: a powerful privacy notion for voting protocols
FPS'11 Proceedings of the 4th Canada-France MITACS conference on Foundations and Practice of Security
A formal analysis of the norwegian e-voting protocol
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Cobra: toward concurrent ballot authorization for internet voting
EVT/WOTE'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections
Trivitas: voters directly verifying votes
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Defining verifiability in e-auction protocols
Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Vote-ID'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Analysis of an electronic boardroom voting system
Vote-ID'13 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Privacy-supporting cloud computing by in-browser key translation
Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust Principles
Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy
Journal of Computer Security
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We present a formal, symbolic definition of election verifiability for electronic voting protocols in the context of the applied pi calculus. Our definition is given in terms of boolean tests which can be performed on the data produced by an election. The definition distinguishes three aspects of verifiability: individual, universal and eligibility verifiability. It also allows us to determine precisely which aspects of the system's hardware and software must be trusted for the purpose of election verifiability. In contrast with earlier work our definition is compatible with a large class of electronic voting schemes, including those based on blind signatures, homomorphic encryption and mixnets. We demonstrate the applicability of our formalism by analysing three protocols: FOO, Helios 2.0, and Civitas (the latter two have been deployed).