Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
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CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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ACISP '01 Proceedings of the 6th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
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International Journal of Information Security
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ARES '07 Proceedings of the The Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
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WOEC'98 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 3
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EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
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Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
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FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
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POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
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An electronic auction protocol will only be used by those who trust that it operates correctly. Therefore, e-auction protocols must be verifiable: seller, buyer and losing bidders must all be able to determine that the result was correct. We pose that the importance of verifiability for e-auctions necessitates a formal analysis. Consequently, we identify notions of verifiability for each stakeholder. We formalize these and then use the developed framework to study the verifiability of two examples, the protocols due to Curtis et al. and Brandt, identifying several issues.