Minimum disclosure proofs of knowledge
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - 27th IEEE Conference on Foundations of Computer Science October 27-29, 1986
Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Efficient Sealed-Bid Auction Using Hash Chain
ICISC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology
How to Prevent Buying of Votes in Computer Elections
ASIACRYPT '94 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Receipt-Free Electronic Voting Schemes for Large Scale Elections
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Non-interactive Private Auctions
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Fair On-Line Auctions without Special Trusted Parties
FC '99 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Financial Cryptography
An Anonymous Aution Protocol with a Single Non-trusted Center Using Binary Trees
ISW '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Information Security
Efficient Sealed-Bid Auctions for Massive Numbers of Bidders with Lump Comparison
ISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information Security
An Auction Protocol Which Hides Bids of Losers
PKC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
M+1-st Price Auction Using Homomorphic Encryption
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
Electronic auctions with private bids
WOEC'98 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 3
Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme: a practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Secure combinatorial auctions by dynamic programming with polynomial secret sharing
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
A second-price sealed-bid auction with verifiable discriminant of ρo-th root
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
A two-server, sealed-bid auction protocol
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Batch ZK Proof and Verification of OR Logic
Information Security and Cryptology
New receipt-free voting scheme using double-trapdoor commitment
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Analysis of a receipt-free auction protocol in the applied pi calculus
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
Challenges in ehealth: from enabling to enforcing privacy
FHIES'11 Proceedings of the First international conference on Foundations of Health Informatics Engineering and Systems
Formal verification of e-auction protocols
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Defining verifiability in e-auction protocols
Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on Information, computer and communications security
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
This paper points out the risk of bid-rigging in electronic sealed-bid auctions and provides a receipt-free sealed-bid auction scheme to prevent it. The scheme enjoys receipt-freeness, secrecy of bidding price and public verifiability and uses a chameleon bit-commitment technique. It requires a bidding booth and a one-way untappable channel from eachbidding boothto each auctioneer.