Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue on economics of electronic commerce
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Fair On-Line Auctions without Special Trusted Parties
FC '99 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Financial Cryptography
The Cocaine Auction Protocol: On the Power of Anonymous Broadcast
IH '99 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Information Hiding
An Auction Protocol Which Hides Bids of Losers
PKC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Electronic auctions with private bids
WOEC'98 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 3
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Cryptographic Protocols for Secure Second-Price Auctions
CIA '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents V
Receipt-Free Sealed-Bid Auction
ISC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Security
M+1-st Price Auction Using Homomorphic Encryption
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
(Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Publicly Verifiable Auctions with Minimal Leakage
COMPSAC '04 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference - Volume 01
Brief announcement: distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
An asynchronous and secure ascending peer-to-peer auction
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions
ICEC '06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Electronic commerce: The new e-commerce: innovations for conquering current barriers, obstacles and limitations to conducting successful business on the internet
A secure double auction protocol against false bids
Decision Support Systems
On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Evolutionary Market Agents for Resource Allocation in Decentralised Systems
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Parallel Problem Solving from Nature: PPSN X
Secure Multiparty Computation for Comparator Networks
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
Efficient Vote Validity Check in Homomorphic Electronic Voting
Information Security and Cryptology --- ICISC 2008
A new secure and efficient M+1st price auction scheme based on ECC system
ASID'09 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Anti-Counterfeiting, security, and identification in communication
Secure combinatorial auctions by dynamic programming with polynomial secret sharing
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
A second-price sealed-bid auction with verifiable discriminant of ρo-th root
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
On server trust in private proxy auctions
Electronic Commerce Research
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
Unconditionally secure first-price auction protocols using a multicomponent commitment scheme
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Auctions in do-not-track compliant internet advertising
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Efficient privacy-preserving protocols for multi-unit auctions
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
An improved double auction protocol against false bids
TrustBus'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Trust, Privacy, and Security in Digital Business
On correctness and privacy in distributed mechanisms
AMEC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms
A robust double auction protocol based on a hybrid trust model
ICISS'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Information Systems Security
Development and evaluation of a secure, privacy preserving combinatorial auction
AISC '11 Proceedings of the Ninth Australasian Information Security Conference - Volume 116
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
This paper presents a new protocol for M + 1st-price auction, a style of auction in which the highest M bidders win and pay a uniform price, determined by the (M +1)st price. A set of distributed servers collaborates to resolve the (M +1)st price without revealing any information in terms of bids including the winners' bids. A new trick to jointly and securely compute the highest value as a degree of distributed polynomials is introduced. The building block requires just one round for bidders to cast bids and one round for auctioneers to determine the winners.