Spawn: A Distributed Computational Economy
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Foundations of distributed artificial intelligence
Foundations of distributed artificial intelligence
Communications of the ACM
Vicious strategies for Vickrey auctions
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents
Multi-Agent Systems: An Introduction to Distributed Artificial Intelligence
Multi-Agent Systems: An Introduction to Distributed Artificial Intelligence
Mix and Match: Secure Function Evaluation via Ciphertexts
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Non-interactive Private Auctions
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
CIA '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents IV, The Future of Information Agents in Cyberspace
Distributed Auction Servers Resolving Winner and Winning Bid without Revealing Privacy of Bids
ICPADS '00 Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems: Workshops
Electronic auctions with private bids
WOEC'98 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 3
How to generate and exchange secrets
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions
ATAL '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VIII
A practical implementation of secure auctions based on multiparty integer computation
FC'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
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In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation, task assignment and last but not least electronic commerce. In many cases the Vickrey (second-price sealed-bid) auction is used as a protocol that prescribes how the individual agents have to interact in order to come to an agreement. The main reasons for choosing the Vickrey auction are the existence of a dominant strategy equilibrium, the low bandwidth and time consumption due to just one round of bidding and the (theoretical) privacy of bids. This paper specifies properties that are needed to ensure the accurate and secret execution of Vickrey auctions and provides a classification of different forms of collusion. We approach the two major security concerns of the Vickrey auction: the vulnerability to a lying auctioneer and the reluctance of bidders to reveal their private valuations. We then propose a novel technique that allows to securely perform second-price auctions. This is achieved using the announcement of encrypted binary bidding lists on a blackboard. Top-down, bottom-up and binary search techniques are used to interactively find the second highest bid step by step without revealing unnecessary information.