Spawn: A Distributed Computational Economy
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Public access to the Internet
CIA '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents IV, The Future of Information Agents in Cyberspace
Cryptographic Protocols for Secure Second-Price Auctions
CIA '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents V
Advantages of a leveled commitment contracting protocol
AAAI'96 Proceedings of the thirteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
ATAL '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VIII
Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Faithfulness in internet algorithms
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
A Trading Agent and Simulator for Keyword Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Computing best-response strategies in infinite games of incomplete information
UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
An Antisocial Strategy for Scheduling Mechanisms
IPDPS '05 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS'05) - Workshop 8 - Volume 09
Autonomous Adaptive Agents for Single Seller Sealed Bid Auctions
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
KES-AMSTA '07 Proceedings of the 1st KES International Symposium on Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications
An evolutionary approach to deception in multi-agent systems
Artificial Intelligence Review
Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Network meta-reasoning for information assurance in mobile agent systems
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Cooperative or vindictive: bidding strategies in sponsored search auction
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Evolutionary bandwidth allocation in reservation-based networks with Vickrey auctions
International Journal of Intelligent Information and Database Systems
Discrete strategies in keyword auctions and their inefficiency for locally aware bidders
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Constrained automated mechanism design for infinite games of incomplete information
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
Electronic Commerce Research
Bidding behaviors for a keyword auction in a sealed-bid environment
Decision Support Systems
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In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation and task assignment. In many cases the Vickrey (second-price sealed-bid) auction is used as a protocol that prescribes how the individual agents have to interact in order to come to an agreement. We show that the Vickrey auction, despite its theoretical benefits, is inappropriate if "antisocial" agents participate in the auction process. More specifically, an antisocial attitude for economic agents that makes reducing the profit of competitors their main goal besides maximizing their own profit is introduced. Under this novel condition, agents need to deviate from the dominant truth-telling strategy. This paper presents a strategy for bidders in repeated Vickrey auctions who are intending to inflict losses to fellow agents in order to be more successful, not in absolute measures, but relatively to the group of bidders. The strategy is evaluated in a simple task allocation scenario.