SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
G-commerce: Market Formulations Controlling Resource Allocation on the Computational Grid
IPDPS '01 Proceedings of the 15th International Parallel & Distributed Processing Symposium
Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions
ATAL '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VIII
Optimization problems in congestion control
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Some Economics of Market-Based Distributed Scheduling
ICDCS '98 Proceedings of the The 18th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Globally Distributed Computation over the Internet - The POPCORN Project
ICDCS '98 Proceedings of the The 18th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems
Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems
Algorithmic mechanism design for load balancing in distributed systems
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics
The performance of bags-of-tasks in large-scale distributed systems
HPDC '08 Proceedings of the 17th international symposium on High performance distributed computing
Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Previous work on task scheduling mechanisms assumed that the agent's goal is to maximize its own profit without considering the effect of its strategy on the other agents' profit. This is not always the case, an agent may want to cause loses to the other agents besides maximizing its profit. Such an agent is said to be an antisocial agent. An antisocial agent will try to gain as much profit as possible relative to the other agents. In this paper we consider a mechanism for task scheduling on related machines in which each machine is associated with an agent. We develop an antisocial strategy which can be used by an antisocial agent to inflict losses to the other participating agents. We analyze the effect of different degrees of agent's antisociality on the losses inflicted to the other agents.