Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Opportunity Cost Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions
Opportunity Cost Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On the Difficulty of Some Shortest Path Problems
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Coalitional games on graphs: core structure, substitutes and frugality
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Reducing truth-telling online mechanisms to online optimization
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation: [extended abstract]
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Mechanism design for policy routing
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Truthful multicast routing in selfish wireless networks
Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
An Antisocial Strategy for Scheduling Mechanisms
IPDPS '05 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS'05) - Workshop 8 - Volume 09
True costs of cheap labor are hard to measure: edge deletion and VCG payments in graphs
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on network algorithms 2005
On certain connectivity properties of the internet topology
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on FOCS 2003
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Distributed Computing - Special issue: PODC 02
Incentive Compatible Cost- and Stability-Based Routing in Ad Hoc Networks
ICPADS '06 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems - Volume 1
Mechanism design for policy routing
Distributed Computing - Special issue: PODC 04
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
OURS: optimal unicast routing systems in non-cooperative wireless networks
Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
On the difficulty of some shortest path problems
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Truthful unsplittable flow for large capacity networks
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallel algorithms and architectures
Generalized trade reduction mechanisms
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Auctions for structured procurement
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Hidden information and actions in multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Mechanism design over discrete domains
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Fault tolerant mechanism design
Artificial Intelligence
A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Theoretical Computer Science
Average-Case Analyses of Vickrey Costs
APPROX '09 / RANDOM '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Workshop and 13th International Workshop on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Note: Path auctions with multiple edge ownership
Theoretical Computer Science
Refining the Cost of Cheap Labor in Set System Auctions
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Preemptive scheduling on selfish machines
CAAN'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Combinatorial and algorithmic aspects of networking
Using nash implementation to achieve better frugality ratios
ISAAC'07 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Algorithms and computation
False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
On the price of truthfulness in path auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Maximizing the minimum load for selfish agents
LATIN'08 Proceedings of the 8th Latin American conference on Theoretical informatics
Mobicent: a credit-based incentive system for disruption tolerant network
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Truthful least-priced-path routing in opportunistic spectrum access networks
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
A strategyproof mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in tree networks
IPDPS'06 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Parallel and distributed processing
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
Mechanisms for complement-free procurement
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
First-passage percolation on a width-2 strip and the path cost in a VCG auction
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
A truthful (2 - 2/k)-approximation mechanism for the steiner tree problem with k terminals*
COCOON'05 Proceedings of the 11th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Economic mechanisms for shortest path cooperative games with incomplete information
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Nash equilibria and dominant strategies in routing
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms
ISAAC'04 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
A monotone approximation algorithm for scheduling with precedence constraints
Operations Research Letters
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Commodity auctions and frugality ratios
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
Truthful incentives in crowdsourcing tasks using regret minimization mechanisms
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Sharing rewards in cooperative connectivity games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Price competition in online combinatorial markets
Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on World wide web
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We consider the problem of selecting a low cost s --- t path in a graph, where the edge costs are a secret known only to the various economic agents who own them. To solve this problem, Nisan and Ronen applied the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which pays a premium to induce edges to reveal their costs truthfully. We observe that this premium can be unacceptably high. There are simple instances where the mechanism pays Θ(k) times the actual cost of the path, even if there is alternate path available that costs only (1 + ε) times as much. This inspires the frugal path problem, which is to design a mechanism that selects a path and induces truthful cost revelation without paying such a high premium.This paper contributes negative results on the frugal path problem. On two large classes of graphs, including ones having three node-disjoint s - t paths, we prove that no reasonable mechanism can always avoid paying a high premium to induce truthtelling. In particular, we introduce a general class of min function mechanisms, and show that all min function mechanisms can be forced to overpay just as badly VCG. On the other hand, we prove that (on two large classes of graphs) every truthful mechanism satisfying some reasonable properties is a min function mechanism.