Sharing the “cost” of multicast trees: an axiomatic analysis
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Truthful multicast routing in selfish wireless networks
Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Hidden information and actions in multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
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Nash equilibria and dominant strategies are two of the major approaches to deal with selfishness in an automated system (AS), where each agent is a selfish entity. In this paper, we consider the scenario when the receiver(s) and the relay links are both selfish, which generalizes the previous scenario in which either the relay links are selfish or the receivers are selfish. This also advances all previous studying in routing by taking into account the budget balance ratio. We prove that no mechanism can achieve budget balance ratio greater than $\frac{1}{n}$ when truthful revealing is a dominant strategy for each of the relay links and receivers. Here, n is the number of vertices in the network. In the meanwhile, we also present a mechanism that achieves the budget balance ratio $\frac{1}{n}$ and is truthful for both the receivers and relay links, which closes the bounds. When we relax the truthful revealing requirement to Nash Equilibrium for relay links, we present a mechanism that achieves an asymptotically optimal budget balance ratio.