Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
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Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
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Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
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Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithms, games, and the internet
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An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auctions
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An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
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Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
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CABOB: a fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
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Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
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Randomized truthful auctions of digital goods are randomizations over truthful auctions
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On complexity of single-minded auction
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Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
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Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework
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A truthful mechanism for the non-utilitarian minimum radius spanning tree problem
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Combination can be hard: approximability of the unique coverage problem
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Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
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SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A sufficient condition for truthfulness with single parameter agents
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
OURS: optimal unicast routing systems in non-cooperative wireless networks
Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Truthful unsplittable flow for large capacity networks
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallel algorithms and architectures
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Generalized trade reduction mechanisms
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Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms
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Exchange market for complex commodities: search for optimal matches
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eBay in the Sky: strategy-proof wireless spectrum auctions
Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
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GreedEx--a scalable clearing mechanism for utility computing
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Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions
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Characterizing truthful mechanisms with convex type spaces
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Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity
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Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification
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GROWRANGE: anytime VCG-based mechanisms
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Implementing the maximum of monotone algorithms
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Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions
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Truthful risk-managed combinatorial auctions
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Maximizing the minimum load for selfish agents
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A strategy-proof combinatorial auction-based grid resource allocation system
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Maximizing the minimum load for selfish agents
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Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
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Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
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Average-case analysis of mechanism design with approximate resource allocation algorithms
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Average-case analysis of VCG with approximate resource allocation algorithms
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Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
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Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
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Mechanisms with verification for any finite domain
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A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions
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Walrasian equilibrium: hardness, approximations and tractable instances
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Nash equilibria and dominant strategies in routing
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Design diffserv multicast with selfish agents
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New constructions of mechanisms with verification
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Greedy approximation via duality for packing, combinatorial auctions and routing
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An experimental study of the misdirection algorithm for combinatorial auctions
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Funding games: the truth but not the whole truth
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Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods
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Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on World wide web
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When attempting to design a truthful mechanism for a computationally hard problem such as combinatorial auctions, one is faced with the problem that most efficiently computable heuristics can not be embedded in any truthful mechanism (e.g. VCG-like payment rules will not ensure truthfulness).We develop a set of techniques that allow constructing efficiently computable truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in the special case where only the valuation is unknown by the mechanism (the single parameter case). For this case we extend the work of Lehmann O'Callaghan, and Shoham, who presented greedy heuristics, and show how to use IF-THEN-ELSE constructs, perform a partial search, and use the LP relaxation. We apply these techniques for several types of combinatorial auctions, obtaining truthful mechanisms with provable approximation ratios.