On complexity of single-minded auction

  • Authors:
  • Ning Chen;Xiaotie Deng;Xiaoming Sun

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, Fudan University, China;Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong;Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Computer and System Sciences
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

We consider complexity issues for a special type of combinatorial auctions, the single-minded auction, where every agent is interested in only one subset of the commodities.First, we present a matching bound on the communication complexity for the single-minded auction under a general communication model. Next, we prove that it is NP-hard to decide whether Walrasian equilibrium exists in a single-minded auction. Finally, we establish a polynomial size duality theorem for the existence of Walrasian equilibrium for the single-minded auction.