Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities

Authors:
Benny Lehmann;Daniel Lehmann;Noam Nisan
Affiliations:
Digital Fuel;The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel;The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Venue:
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Year:
2001

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Abstract

In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such buyers. The valuations of such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of valuations that exhibit no complementarities, a hierarchy that includes also OR and XOR combinations of singleton valuations, and valuations satisfying the gross substitutes property. While we show that the allocation problem among valuations with decreasing marginal utilities is NP-hard, we present an efficient greedy 2-approximation algorithm for this case. No such approximation algorithm exists in a setting allowing for complementarities. Some results about strategic aspects of combinatorial auctions among players with decreasing marginal utilities are also presented.