Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency
Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency
A resource-allocation queueing fairness measure
Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Lower bound for envy-free and truthful makespan approximation on related machines
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Mechanisms and impossibilities for truthful, envy-free allocations
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Proceedings of the sixth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We give a non-trivial class of valuation functions for which we give auctions that are efficient, truthful and envy-free. We give interesting classes of valuations for which one can design such auctions. Surprisingly, we also show that minor modifications to these valuations lead to impossibility results, the most surprising of which is that for a natural class of valuations, one cannot achieve efficiency, truthfulness, envy freeness, individual rationality, and no positive transfers. We also show that such auctions also imply a truthful mechanism for computing bundle prices ("shrink wrapped" bundles of items), that clear the market. This extends the class of valuations for which truthful market clearing prices mechanisms exist.