Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tighter approximation bounds for LPT scheduling in two special cases
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A deterministic truthful PTAS for scheduling related machines
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Fast monotone 3-approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
A global characterization of envy-free truthful scheduling of two tasks
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Truth, envy, and truthful market clearing bundle pricing
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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We study problems of scheduling jobs on related machines so as to minimize the makespan in the setting where machines are strategic agents. In this problem, each job j has a length lj and each machine i has a private speed ti. The running time of job j on machine i is tilj. We seek a mechanism that obtains speed bids of machines and then assign jobs and payments to machines so that the machines have incentive to report true speeds and the allocation and payments are also envy-free. We show that 1. A deterministic envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism cannot approximate the makespan strictly better than 2 - 1/m, where m is the number of machines. This result contrasts with prior work giving a deterministic PTAS for envy-free anonymous assignment and a distinct deterministic PTAS for truthful anonymous mechanism. 2. For two machines of different speeds, the unique deterministic scalable allocation of any envy-free, truthful, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism is to allocate all jobs to the quickest machine. This allocation is the same as that of the VCG mechanism, yielding a 2-approximation to the minimum makespan. 3. No payments can make any of the prior published monotone and locally efficient allocations that yield better than an m-approximation. for Q||Cmax [1,3,5,9,13] a truthful, envy-free, individually rational, and anonymous mechanism.