Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Randomized truthful auctions of digital goods are randomizations over truthful auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
How to route and tax selfish unsplittable traffic
Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
An Antisocial Strategy for Scheduling Mechanisms
IPDPS '05 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS'05) - Workshop 8 - Volume 09
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Online auctions with re-usable goods
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On decentralized incentive compatible mechanisms
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Marriage, honesty, and stability
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A truthful mechanism for the non-utilitarian minimum radius spanning tree problem
Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
A sufficient condition for truthfulness with single parameter agents
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on network algorithms 2005
Passive verification of the strategyproofness of mechanisms in open environments
ICEC '06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Electronic commerce: The new e-commerce: innovations for conquering current barriers, obstacles and limitations to conducting successful business on the internet
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
Theoretical Computer Science
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks
Theoretical Computer Science
Pricing of partially compatible products
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An algorithm composition scheme preserving monotonicity
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Routing selfish unsplittable traffic
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Externalities in online advertising
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms for makespan and other scheduling problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Truthful germs are contagious: a local to global characterization of truthfulness
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism design over discrete domains
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Characterizing truthfulness in discrete domains
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Deterministic monotone algorithms for scheduling on related machines
Theoretical Computer Science
A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Characterizing truthful mechanisms with convex type spaces
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
The power of verification for one-parameter agents
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification
Theoretical Computer Science
Randomized Truthful Mechanisms for Scheduling Unrelated Machines
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Sponsored Search Auctions with Markovian Users
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Approximation and Online Algorithms
Theoretical Computer Science
Strongly polynomial-time truthful mechanisms in one shot
Theoretical Computer Science
Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
Tighter approximation bounds for LPT scheduling in two special cases
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
Characterizing truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms: extended abstract
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximate mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On designing truthful mechanisms for online scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
On the importance of migration for fairness in online grid markets
GRID '08 Proceedings of the 2008 9th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Grid Computing
Mechanism design for single-value domains
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 4
Concurrent auctions across the supply chain
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Chain: a dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Truthful risk-managed combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
Journal of Scheduling
Maximizing the minimum load for selfish agents
Theoretical Computer Science
Note: Path auctions with multiple edge ownership
Theoretical Computer Science
When ignorance helps: Graphical multicast cost sharing games
Theoretical Computer Science
On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-Parameter Agents
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
SOFA: Strategyproof Online Frequency Allocation for Multihop Wireless Networks
ISAAC '09 Proceedings of the 20th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Priority Right Auction for Komi Setting
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Cost sharing methods for makespan and completion time scheduling
STACS'07 Proceedings of the 24th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Mechanism Design for Decentralized Online Machine Scheduling
Operations Research
Preemptive scheduling on selfish machines
CAAN'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Combinatorial and algorithmic aspects of networking
Using nash implementation to achieve better frugality ratios
ISAAC'07 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Algorithms and computation
Mechanism design on trust networks
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Approximate mechanisms for the graphical TSP and other graph traversal problems
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
On the price of truthfulness in path auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Characterizing truthful market design
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Communications of the ACM
Buyer-supplier games: optimization over the core
WAOA'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
Maximizing the minimum load for selfish agents
LATIN'08 Proceedings of the 8th Latin American conference on Theoretical informatics
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue maximization with a single sample
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Socially desirable approximations for Dodgson's voting rule
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful assignment without money
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
A deterministic truthful PTAS for scheduling related machines
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
A strategyproof mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in tree networks
IPDPS'06 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Parallel and distributed processing
A strategyproof mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in bus networks without control processors
IPDPS'06 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Parallel and distributed processing
Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Buyer-games: Optimization over the core
Theoretical Computer Science
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
A truthful constant approximation for maximizing the minimum load on related machines
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Mosaic-Net: a game theoretical method for selection and allocation of replicas in ad hoc networks
The Journal of Supercomputing
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Mechanism design with uncertain inputs: (to err is human, to forgive divine)
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
NETWORKING'11 Proceedings of the 10th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part II
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Lower bound for envy-free and truthful makespan approximation on related machines
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
A truthful mechanism for value-based scheduling in cloud computing
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
SIAM Journal on Computing
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Mechanisms with verification for any finite domain
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Bayesian optimal no-deficit mechanism design
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Strongly polynomial-time truthful mechanisms in one shot
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On the existence of truthful mechanisms for the minimum-cost approximate shortest-paths tree problem
SIROCCO'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
Decentralization and mechanism design for online machine scheduling
SWAT'06 Proceedings of the 10th Scandinavian conference on Algorithm Theory
Fast monotone 3-approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Improvements for truthful mechanisms with verifiable one-parameter selfish agents
WAOA'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
Designing a truthful mechanism for a spanning arborescence bicriteria problem
CAAN'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Networking
A trust-based game theoretical model for Web services collaboration
Knowledge-Based Systems
Walrasian equilibrium: hardness, approximations and tractable instances
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
An incentive-based distributed mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in tree networks
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines
CIAC'06 Proceedings of the 6th Italian conference on Algorithms and Complexity
Tighter approximation bounds for LPT scheduling in two special cases
CIAC'06 Proceedings of the 6th Italian conference on Algorithms and Complexity
New constructions of mechanisms with verification
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Efficient truthful mechanisms for the single-source shortest paths tree problem
Euro-Par'05 Proceedings of the 11th international Euro-Par conference on Parallel Processing
Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Deterministic monotone algorithms for scheduling on related machines
WAOA'04 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms
ISAAC'04 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
On designing truthful mechanisms for online scheduling
SIROCCO'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
A global characterization of envy-free truthful scheduling of two tasks
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
ACM Transactions on Computation Theory (TOCT)
Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms
Mathematics of Operations Research
A monotone approximation algorithm for scheduling with precedence constraints
Operations Research Letters
Approximations and auctions for scheduling batches on related machines
Operations Research Letters
Near-optimal scheduling mechanisms for deadline-sensitive jobs in large computing clusters
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Approximation Techniques for Utilitarian Mechanism Design
SIAM Journal on Computing
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Scheduling selfish tasks: about the performance of truthful algorithms
COCOON'07 Proceedings of the 13th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Inaugural Issue
Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Combinatorial auction-based allocation of virtual machine instances in clouds
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
Future Generation Computer Systems
Truthfulness and stochastic dominance with monetary transfers
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Which mechanism for sponsored search auctions with externalities?
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Using lotteries to approximate the optimal revenue
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Complex-demand knapsack problems and incentives in AC power systems
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Computationally efficient techniques for economic mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Competitive auctions for markets with positive externalities
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Approximate Mechanism Design without Money
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
Theoretical Computer Science
Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on World wide web
A Truthful Mechanism for Value-Based Scheduling in Cloud Computing
Theory of Computing Systems
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In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent's secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent's secret data is the cost she incurs per unit load. We give an exact characterization for the algorithms that can be used to design truthful mechanisms for such load balancing problems using appropriate side payments.We use our characterization to design polynomial time truthful mechanisms for several problems in combinatorial optimization to which the celebrated VCG mechanism does not apply. For scheduling related parallel machines (\left. Q \right\|C_{\max }), we give a 3-approximation mechanism based on randomized rounding of the optimal fractional solution. This problem is NP-complete, and the standard approximation algorithms (greedy load-balancing or the PTAS) cannot be used in truthful mechanisms. We show our mechanism to be frugal, in that the total payment needed is only a logarithmic factor more than the actual costs incurred by the machines, unless one machine dominates the total processing power. We also give truthful mechanisms for maximum flow, \left. Q \right\|\sum {C_j} (scheduling related machines to minimize the sum of completion times), optimizing an affine function over a fixed set, and special cases of uncapacitated facility location. In addition, for \left. Q \right\|\sum {w_j } C_j (minimizing the weighted sum of completion times), we prove a lower bound of \frac{2}{{\sqrt 3 }} for the best approximation ratio achievable by a truthful mechanism.