A data structure for dynamic trees
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Minimizing Diameters of Dynamic Trees
ICALP '97 Proceedings of the 24th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
On-line Network Optimization Problems
Developments from a June 1996 seminar on Online algorithms: the state of the art
Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Vickrey Prices and Shortest Paths: What is an Edge Worth?
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Efficient truthful mechanisms for the single-source shortest paths tree problem: Research Articles
Concurrency and Computation: Practice & Experience - Parallel and Distributed Computing (EuroPar 2005)
On the existence of truthful mechanisms for the minimum-cost approximate shortest-paths tree problem
SIROCCO'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
Decentralization and mechanism design for online machine scheduling
SWAT'06 Proceedings of the 10th Scandinavian conference on Algorithm Theory
A truthful (2 - 2/k)-approximation mechanism for the steiner tree problem with k terminals*
COCOON'05 Proceedings of the 11th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
| Hi-index | 5.23 |
In this paper we address the question of designing truthful mechanisms for solving optimization problems on dynamic graphs with selfish edges. More precisely, we are given a graph G of n nodes, and we assume that each edge of G is owned by a selfish agent. The strategy of an agent consists in revealing to the system-at each time instant-the cost at the actual time for using its edge. Additionally, edges can enter into and exit from G. Among the various possible assumptions which can be made to model how this edge-cost modifications take place, we focus on two settings: (i) the dynamic, in which modifications can happen at any time, and for a given optimization problem on G, the mechanism has to maintain efficiently the output specification and the payment scheme for the agents; (ii) the time-sequenced, in which modifications happens at fixed time steps, and the mechanism has to minimize an objective function which takes into consideration both the quality and the set-up cost of a new solution. In both settings, we investigate the existence of exact and approximate truthful (w.r.t. to suitable equilibrium concepts) mechanisms. In particular, for the dynamic setting, we analyze the minimum spanning tree problem, and we show that if edge costs can only decrease and each agent adopts a myopic best response strategy (i.e., its utility is only measured instantaneously), then there exists an efficient dynamic truthful (in myopic best response equilibrium) mechanism for handling a sequence of k declarations of edge-cost reductions having runtime O((h+k)logn), where h is the overall number of payment changes.