Probabilistic construction of deterministic algorithms: approximating packing integer programs
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - 27th IEEE Conference on Foundations of Computer Science October 27-29, 1986
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Random Structures & Algorithms - Probabilistic methods in combinatorial optimization
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Communication Complexity of Approximate Set Packing and Covering
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
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Multicommodity flow, well-linked terminals, and routing problems
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the computational power of iterative auctions
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Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
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Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
IAT '06 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Truthful unsplittable flow for large capacity networks
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Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Stochastic packing-market planning
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Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
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Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Data enginering issues in E-commerce and services: In conjunction with ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC '07)
Buying cheap is expensive: hardness of non-parametric multi-product pricing
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Better mechanisms for combinatorial auctions via maximal-in-range algorithms?
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
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Item pricing for revenue maximization
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
APPROX '07/RANDOM '07 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Item pricing for revenue maximization
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Performance Analysis about Parallel Greedy Approximation on Combinatorial Auctions
PRIMA '08 Proceedings of the 11th Pacific Rim International Conference on Multi-Agents: Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Theoretical Computer Science
Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
Fast Partial Reallocation in Combinatorial Auctions for Iterative Resource Allocation
Agent Computing and Multi-Agent Systems
Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximate mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal Auctions Capturing Constraints in Sponsored Search
AAIM '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing
APPROX '09 / RANDOM '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Workshop and 13th International Workshop on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
On 2-Player Randomized Mechanisms for Scheduling
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Truthful unsplittable flow for large capacity networks
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Toward a large scale E-market: a greedy and local search based winner determination
IEA/AIE'07 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Industrial, engineering, and other applications of applied intelligent systems
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games
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Truthful assignment without money
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Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
An approach to vickrey-based resource allocation in the presence of monopolistic sellers
AusGrid '09 Proceedings of the Seventh Australasian Symposium on Grid Computing and e-Research - Volume 99
An experimental analysis of biased parallel greedy approximation for combinatorial auctions
International Journal of Intelligent Information and Database Systems
Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Utilitarian mechanism design for multi-objective optimization
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
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ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
Single-parameter combinatorial auctions with partially public valuations
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Truthful mechanisms for exhibitions
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Approximation algorithms for non-single-minded profit-maximization problems with limited supply
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Average-case analysis of mechanism design with approximate resource allocation algorithms
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Average-case analysis of VCG with approximate resource allocation algorithms
Decision Support Systems
Approximation algorithms for secondary spectrum auctions
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Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
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A truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms: toward optimal combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Mechanism design with uncertain inputs: (to err is human, to forgive divine)
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Black-box reductions in mechanism design
APPROX'11/RANDOM'11 Proceedings of the 14th international workshop and 15th international conference on Approximation, randomization, and combinatorial optimization: algorithms and techniques
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A truthful mechanism for value-based scheduling in cloud computing
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Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions
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Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
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STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Optimization with demand oracles
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The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions
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Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers
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Approximation Techniques for Utilitarian Mechanism Design
SIAM Journal on Computing
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ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Funding games: the truth but not the whole truth
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Decomposing combinatorial auctions and set packing problems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On revenue maximization for agents with costly information acquisition: extended abstract
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Approximate Mechanism Design without Money
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
A Truthful Mechanism for Value-Based Scheduling in Cloud Computing
Theory of Computing Systems
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We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any \alpha-approximation algorithm that also bounds the integrality gap of the LP relaxation of the problem by \alpha can be used to construct an \alpha-approximation mechanism that is truthful in expectation. This immediately yields a variety of new and significantly improved results for various problem domains and furthermore, yields truthful (in expectation) mechanisms with guarantees that match the best known approximation guaranteeswhen truthfulness is not required. In particular, we obtain the first truthful mechanisms with approximation guarantees for a variety of multi-parameter domains. We obtain truthful (in expectation) mechanisms achieving approximation guarantees of O(\sqrt m ) for combinatorial auctions (CAs),(1+ \in) for multiunit CAs with B = \Omega (\log m) copies of each item, and 2 for multi-parameter knapsack problems (multi-unit auctions).Our construction is based on considering an LP relaxation of the problem and using the classic VCG [24, 9, 12] mechanism to obtain a truthful mechanism in this fractional domain. We argue that the (fractional) optimal solution scaled down by \alpha where \alpha is the integrality gap of the problem, can be represented as a convex combination of integer solutions, and by viewing this convex combination as specifying a probability distribution over integer solutions, we get a randomized, truthful in expectation mechanism. Our construction can be seen as a way of exploiting VCG in a computational tractable way even when the underlying social-welfare maximization problem is NP-hard.