STOC '97 Proceedings of the twenty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Lectures on modern convex optimization: analysis, algorithms, and engineering applications
Lectures on modern convex optimization: analysis, algorithms, and engineering applications
Convex Optimization
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithmic Game Theory
Maximizing Non-Monotone Submodular Functions
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle model
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Maximizing a Submodular Set Function Subject to a Matroid Constraint (Extended Abstract)
IPCO '07 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
APPROX '07/RANDOM '07 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
On the Hardness of Being Truthful
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
FOCS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Black-Box Randomized Reductions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms: toward optimal combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
From query complexity to computational complexity
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Secondary spectrum auctions for symmetric and submodular bidders
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
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In Combinatorial Public Projects, there is a set of projects that may be undertaken, and a set of self-interested players with a stake in the set of projects chosen. A public planner must choose a subset of these projects, subject to a resource constraint, with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Combinatorial Public Projects has emerged as one of the paradigmatic problems in Algorithmic Mechanism Design, a field concerned with solving fundamental resource allocation problems in the presence of both selfish behavior and the computational constraint of polynomial time. We design a polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1/e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental variant of combinatorial public projects. Our results apply to combinatorial public projects when players have valuations that are matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions and matroid weighted-rank functions. Our approximation factor is the best possible, assuming P ≠ NP. Ours is the first mechanism that achieves a constant factor approximation for a natural NP-hard variant of combinatorial public projects.