A combinatorial, strongly polynomial-time algorithm for minimizing submodular functions
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms for allocation problems: Improving the factor of 1 - 1/e
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Maximizing Non-Monotone Submodular Functions
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle model
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
APPROX '07/RANDOM '07 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On the Hardness of Being Truthful
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximating submodular functions everywhere
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
FOCS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
A deterministic truthful PTAS for scheduling related machines
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms: toward optimal combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Extending characterizations of truthful mechanisms from subdomains to domains
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
From query complexity to computational complexity
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimization with demand oracles
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Efficiency-revenue trade-offs in auctions
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Simultaneous single-item auctions
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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We show that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations that provides an approximation ratio of m1/ 2 -ε must use exponentially many value queries, where m is the number of items. In contrast, ignoring incentives there exist constant ratio approximation algorithms for this problem. Our approach is based on a novel direct hardness technique that completely skips the notoriously hard step of characterizing truthful mechanisms. The characterization step was the main obstacle for proving impossibility results in algorithmic mechanism design so far. We demonstrate two additional applications of our new technique: (1) an impossibility result for universally-truthful polynomial time flexible combinatorial public projects and (2) an impossibility result for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for exact combinatorial public projects. The latter is the first result that bounds the power of polynomial-time truthful in expectation mechanisms in any setting.