The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximate mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On designing truthful mechanisms for online scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
Maximizing the minimum load for selfish agents
Theoretical Computer Science
On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Maximizing the Minimum Load: The Cost of Selfishness
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Communications of the ACM
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pricing randomized allocations
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
A deterministic truthful PTAS for scheduling related machines
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
A truthful constant approximation for maximizing the minimum load on related machines
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Mechanism design with uncertain inputs: (to err is human, to forgive divine)
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Lower bound for envy-free and truthful makespan approximation on related machines
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms
Mathematics of Operations Research
Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximate Mechanism Design without Money
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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We present the first monotone randomized polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for minimizing the makespan of parallel related machines (Q| |C_max), the paradigmatic problem in single-parameter algorithmic mechanism design. This result immediately gives a polynomial-time, truthful (in expectation) mechanism whose approximation guarantee attains the best-possible one for all polynomial-time algorithms (assuming P not equal to NP). Our algorithmic techniques are flexible and also yield, among other results, a monotone deterministic quasi-PTAS for Q| |C_max and a monotone randomized PTAS for max-min scheduling on related machines.