Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Randomized Truthful Mechanisms for Scheduling Unrelated Machines
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
On 2-Player Randomized Mechanisms for Scheduling
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Revenue maximization with a single sample
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Correlation robust stochastic optimization
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Mechanism design via correlation gap
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Prior-independent multi-parameter mechanism design
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
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We study the makespan minimization problem with unrelated selfish machines under the assumption that job sizes are stochastic. We design simple truthful mechanisms that under different distributional assumptions provide constant and sublogarithmic approximations to expected makespan. Our mechanisms are prior-independent in that they do not rely on knowledge of the job size distributions. Prior-independent approximations were previously known only for the revenue maximization objective [13, 11, 26]. In contrast to our results, in prior-free settings no truthful anonymous deterministic mechanism for the makespan objective can provide a sublinear approximation [3].