Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract

Authors:
Edith Cohen;Michal Feldman;Amos Fiat;Haim Kaplan;Svetlana Olonetsky
Affiliations:
AT&T Labs-Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA;Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Microsoft Israel R & D, Jerusalem, Israel;Tal Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel;Tal Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel;Tal Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
Venue:
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Year:
2010

Citing 13
Cited 5

Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines

Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)

STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing

SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Combination can be hard: approximability of the unique coverage problem

SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity

Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Dynamic pricing for impatient bidders

SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract

SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Optimal envy-free pricing with metric substitutability

Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Uniform Budgets and the Envy-Free Pricing Problem

ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms

Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders

WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms

MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines

ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming

Lower bound for envy-free and truthful makespan approximation on related machines

SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
A global characterization of envy-free truthful scheduling of two tasks

WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling

Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium

Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.01

Visualization

Abstract

We study envy-free mechanisms for scheduling tasks on unrelated machines (agents) that approximately minimize the makespan. For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free poly-time mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor of O(log m), where m is the number of machines. We also show a lower bound of γ(log m / log log m). This improves the recent result of Mu'alem [22] who give an upper bound of (m+1)/2, and a lower bound of 2-1/m. For divisible tasks, we show that there always exists an envy-free poly-time mechanism with optimal makespan. Finally, we demonstrate how our mechanism for envy free makespan minimization can be interpreted as a market clearing problem.