Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets

Authors:
Michal Feldman;Amos Fiat;Stefano Leonardi;Piotr Sankowski
Affiliations:
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Harvard University, Jerusalem, Israel;Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel;Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy;University of Warsaw and Sapienza University of Rome, Warsaw, Poland
Venue:
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Year:
2012

Citing 16
Cited 1

On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing

SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Combination can be hard: approximability of the unique coverage problem

SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Single-minded unlimited supply pricing on sparse instances

SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
A resource allocation queueing fairness measure: properties and bounds

Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
Item pricing for revenue maximization

Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximation Algorithms for Single-minded Envy-free Profit-maximization Problems with Limited Supply

FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits

FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Google's Auction for TV Ads

ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th Internatilonal Collogquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part II
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics

WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Envy, Multi Envy, and Revenue Maximization

WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders

WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract

Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (Co-located with FCRC 2011)
Single valued combinatorial auctions with budgets

Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Envy, truth, and profit

Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truth, envy, and truthful market clearing bundle pricing

WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics

Sponsored search auctions

Proceedings of the sixth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We study envy-free (EF) mechanisms for multi-unit auctions with budgeted agents that approximately maximize revenue. In an EF auction, prices are set so that every bidder receives a bundle that maximizes her utility amongst all bundles; We show that the problem of revenue-maximizing EF auctions is NP-hard, even for the case of identical items and additive valuations (up to the budget). The main result of our paper is a novel EF auction that runs in polynomial time and provides a approximation of 1/2 with respect to the revenue-maximizing EF auction. A slight variant of our mechanism will produce an allocation and pricing that is more restrictive (so called item pricing) and gives a 1/2 approximation to the optimal revenue within this more restrictive class.