Envy-free auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Mechanism Design via Machine Learning
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Optimal mechanism design and money burning
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On random sampling auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
Revenue maximization with a single sample
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism design via consensus estimates, cross checking, and profit extraction
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Revenue enhancement in ad auctions
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Selling in Exclusive Markets: Some Observations on Prior-Free Mechanism Design
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
Prior-free auctions for budgeted agents
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Auctions with unique equilibria
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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We consider profit maximizing (incentive compatible) mechanism design in general environments that include, e.g., position auctions (for selling advertisements on Internet search engines) and single-minded combinatorial auctions. We analyze optimal envy-free pricings in these settings, and give economic justification for using the optimal revenue of envy-free pricings as a benchmark for prior-free mechanism design and analysis. Moreover, we show that envy-free pricing has a simple nice structure and a strong connection to incentive compatible mechanism design, and we exploit this connection to design prior-free mechanisms with strong approximation guarantees.