Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-unit auctions with unknown supply
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal mechanism design and money burning
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On random sampling auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the competitive ratio of the random sampling auction
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
An Online Multi-unit Auction with Improved Competitive Ratio
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Revenue maximization with a single sample
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism design via consensus estimates, cross checking, and profit extraction
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Dynamic pricing with limited supply
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Selling in Exclusive Markets: Some Observations on Prior-Free Mechanism Design
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful incentives in crowdsourcing tasks using regret minimization mechanisms
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
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We study auctions for selling a limited supply of a single commodity in the case where the supply is known in advance and the case it is unknown and must be instead allocated in an online fashion. The latter variant was proposed by Mahdian and Saberi [12] as a model of an important phenomena in auctions for selling Internet advertising: advertising impressions must be allocated as they arrive and the total quantity available is unknown in advance. We describe the Bayesian optimal mechanism for these variants and extend the random sampling auction of Goldberg et al. [8] to address the prior-free case.