An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On random sampling auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue maximization with a single sample
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Selling in Exclusive Markets: Some Observations on Prior-Free Mechanism Design
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
Prior-free auctions for budgeted agents
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Auctions with unique equilibria
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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There is only one technique for prior-free optimal mechanism design that generalizes beyond the structurally benevolent setting of digital goods. This technique uses random sampling to estimate the distribution of agent values and then employs the Bayesian optimal mechanism for this estimated distribution on the remaining players. Though quite general, even for digital goods, this random sampling auction has a complicated analysis and is known to be suboptimal. To overcome these issues we generalize the profit extraction and consensus techniques from [5] to structurally rich environments that include, e.g., single-minded combinatorial auctions.