Bayes-nash equilibria of the generalized second price auction
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
GSP auctions with correlated types
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal crowdsourcing contests
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Mechanism design via consensus estimates, cross checking, and profit extraction
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We study Bayes-Nash equilibria in a large class of anonymous order-based auctions. These include the generalized first-price auction for allocating positions to bidders, e.g., for sponsored search. We show that when bidders' values are independent and identically distributed the symmetric equilibrium is unique and efficient. Importantly, our proof is simple and structurally revealing. This uniqueness result for the generalized first-price auction is in stark contrast to the generalized second-price auction where there may be no efficient equilibrium. This result suggests, e.g., that first-price payment semantics may have advantages over second-price payment semantics. Our results extend also to certain models of risk aversion.