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Revenue guarantees in sponsored search auctions
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Repeated Budgeted Second Price Ad Auction
Theory of Computing Systems
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The Generalized Second Price Auction has been the main mechanism used by search companies to auction positions for advertisements on search pages. In this paper we study the social welfare of the Nash equilibria of this game in various models. In the full information setting, socially optimal Nash equilibria are known to exist (i.e., the Price of Stability is 1). This paper is the first to prove bounds on the price of anarchy, and to give any bounds in the Bayesian setting. Our main result is to show that the price of anarchy is small assuming that all bidders play un-dominated strategies. In the full information setting we prove a bound of 1.618 for the price of anarchy for pure Nash equilibria, and a bound of 4 for mixed Nash equilibria. We also prove a bound of 8 for the price of anarchy in the Bayesian setting, when valuations are drawn independently, and the valuation is known only to the bidder and only the distributions used are common knowledge. Our proof exhibits a combinatorial structure of Nash equilibria and uses this structure to bound the price of anarchy. While establishing the structure is simple in the case of pure and mixed Nash equilibria, the extension to the Bayesian setting requires the use of novel combinatorial techniques that can be of independent interest.