Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Internet Ad Auctions: Insights and Directions
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bayes-nash equilibria of the generalized second price auction
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
GSP auctions with correlated types
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
GSP auctions with correlated types
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Externalities among advertisers in sponsored search
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On revenue in the generalized second price auction
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Communications of the ACM
Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
Electronic Commerce Research
Revenue guarantees in sponsored search auctions
ESA'12 Proceedings of the 20th Annual European conference on Algorithms
Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Hi-index | 0.02 |
In sponsored search auctions, advertisers compete for a number of available advertisement slots of different quality. The auctioneer decides the allocation of advertisers to slots using bids provided by them. Since the advertisers may act strategically and submit their bids in order to maximize their individual objectives, such an auction naturally defines a strategic game among the advertisers. In order to quantify the efficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions, we study the corresponding games and present new bounds on their price of anarchy, improving the recent results of Paes Leme and Tardos [16] and Lucier and Paes Leme [13]. For the full information setting, we prove a surprisingly low upper bound of 1.282 on the price of anarchy over pure Nash equilibria. Given the existing lower bounds, this bound denotes that the number of advertisers has almost no impact on the price of anarchy. The proof exploits the equilibrium conditions developed in [16] and follows by a detailed reasoning about the structure of equilibria and a novel relation of the price of anarchy to the objective value of a compact mathematical program. For more general equilibrium classes (i.e., mixed Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria), we present an upper bound of 2.310 on the price of anarchy. We also consider the setting where advertisers have incomplete information about their competitors and prove a price of anarchy upper bound of 3.037 over Bayes-Nash equilibria. In order to obtain the last two bounds, we adapt techniques of Lucier and Paes Leme [13] and significantly extend them with new arguments.