Journal of the ACM (JACM)
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - STOC 2002
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithmic Game Theory
Regret minimization and the price of total anarchy
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The “Price of Anarchy” Under Nonlinear and Asymmetric Costs
Mathematics of Operations Research
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiplicative updates outperform generic no-regret learning in congestion games: extended abstract
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
SIAM Journal on Computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
The limits of smoothness: a primal-dual framework for price of anarchy bounds
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
SIAM Journal on Computing
On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games,,
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Price of stability in polynomial congestion games
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
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The price of anarchy, defined as the ratio of the worst-case objective function value of a Nash equilibrium of a game and that of an optimal outcome, quantifies the inefficiency of selfish behavior. Remarkably good bounds on this measure are known for a wide range of application domains. However, such bounds are meaningful only if a game's participants successfully reach a Nash equilibrium. This drawback motivates inefficiency bounds that apply more generally to weaker notions of equilibria, such as mixed Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria, or to sequences of outcomes generated by natural experimentation strategies, such as simultaneous regret-minimization. We prove a general and fundamental connection between the price of anarchy and its seemingly more general relatives. First, we identify a "canonical sufficient condition" for an upper bound on the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria, which we call a smoothness argument. Second, we prove an "extension theorem": every bound on the price of anarchy that is derived via a smoothness argument extends automatically, with no quantitative degradation in the bound, to mixed Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and the average objective function value of every no-regret sequence of joint repeated play. Third, we prove that in routing games, smoothness arguments are "complete" in a proof-theoretic sense: despite their automatic generality, they are guaranteed to produce an optimal worst-case upper bound on the price of anarchy.