FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
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The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sink Equilibria and Convergence
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Inapproximability of pure nash equilibria
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Regret minimization and the price of total anarchy
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Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
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Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
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Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
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Weighted congestion games: price of anarchy, universal worst-case examples, and tightness
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Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The limits of smoothness: a primal-dual framework for price of anarchy bounds
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Routing (un-) splittable flow in games with player-specific affine latency functions
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GSP auctions with correlated types
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On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions
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Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goods
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Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
SIAM Journal on Computing
On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games,,
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Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in atomic splittable congestion games
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
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The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information
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Risk sensitivity of price of anarchy under uncertainty
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Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
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We define smooth games of incomplete information. We prove an "extension theorem" for such games: price of anarchy bounds for pure Nash equilibria for all induced full-information games extend automatically, without quantitative degradation, to all mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibria with respect to a product prior distribution over players' preferences. We also note that, for Bayes-Nash equilibria in games with correlated player preferences, there is no general extension theorem for smooth games. We give several applications of our definition and extension theorem. First, we show that many games of incomplete information for which the price of anarchy has been studied are smooth in our sense. Thus our extension theorem unifies much of the known work on the price of anarchy in games of incomplete information. Second, we use our extension theorem to prove new bounds on the price of anarchy of Bayes-Nash equilibria in congestion games with incomplete information.