Parallel and Distributed Computation: Numerical Methods
Parallel and Distributed Computation: Numerical Methods
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - STOC 2002
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The effect of collusion in congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Selfish Load Balancing and Atomic Congestion Games
Algorithmica
A new model for selfish routing
Theoretical Computer Science
Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
SIAM Journal on Computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Total latency in singleton congestion games
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
On the existence of pure nash equilibria inweighted congestion games
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
Exact price of anarchy for polynomial congestion games
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games,,
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Atomic congestion games among coalitions
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Optimal cost sharing protocols for scheduling games
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Restoring pure equilibria to weighted congestion games
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
SIAM Journal on Computing
Interplay between security providers, consumers, and attackers: a weighted congestion game approach
GameSec'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
On the Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
On bidimensional congestion games
SIROCCO'12 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
LP-Based covering games with low price of anarchy
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Smooth inequalities and equilibrium inefficiency in scheduling games
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal Cost Sharing for Resource Selection Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
Price of stability in polynomial congestion games
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
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We characterize the price of anarchy in weighted congestion games, as a function of the allowable resource cost functions. Our results provide as thorough an understanding of this quantity as is already known for nonatomic and unweighted congestion games, and take the form of universal (cost function-independent) worst-case examples. One noteworthy byproduct of our proofs is the fact that weighted congestion games are "tight", which implies that the worst-case price of anarchy with respect to pure Nash, mixed Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria are always equal (under mild conditions on the allowable cost functions). Another is the fact that, like nonatomic but unlike atomic (unweighted) congestion games, weighted congestion games with trivial structure already realize the worst-case POA, at least for polynomial cost functions. We also prove a new result about unweighted congestion games: the worst-case price of anarchy in symmetric games is, as the number of players goes to infinity, as large as in their more general asymmetric counterparts.