The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
SIAM Journal on Computing
Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On the existence of pure nash equilibria inweighted congestion games
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
Weighted congestion games: price of anarchy, universal worst-case examples, and tightness
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
On the Performance of Approximate Equilibria in Congestion Games
Algorithmica - Special Issue: European Symposium on Algorithms, Design and Analysis
Algorithmica
Exact price of anarchy for polynomial congestion games
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games,,
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We introduce multidimensional congestion games, that is, congestion games whose set of players can be partitioned into k+1 clusters C0,C1,…,Ck. Players in C0 have full information about all the other participants in the game, while players in Ci, for any 1≤i≤k, have full information only about the members of C0∪Ci and are unaware of all the other ones. This model has at least two interesting applications: (i) it is a special case of graphical congestion games in which the game's social knowledge graph is undirected and has independence number equal to k, and (ii) it models scenarios in which players may be of different types and the level of competition that each player experiences on a resource depends on the player's type and on the types of the other players sharing the resource. We focus on the case in which k=2 and the cost function associated with each resource is linear and show bounds on the prices of anarchy and stability for two different social functions.