Improved Bounds for Facility Location Games with Fair Cost Allocation
COCOA '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
Atomic routing games on maximum congestion
Theoretical Computer Science
The Efficiency of Fair Division
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
Theoretical Computer Science
Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Weighted congestion games: price of anarchy, universal worst-case examples, and tightness
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
Mixing time and stationary expected social welfare of logit dynamics
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On approximate nash equilibria in network design
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Stackelberg strategies for network design games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Strategic cooperation in cost sharing games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Strategic multiway cut and multicut games
WAOA'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
SIAM Journal on Computing
Optimal cost sharing protocols for scheduling games
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Congestion games with variable demands
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Restoring pure equilibria to weighted congestion games
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
On the quality and complexity of pareto equilibria in the job scheduling game
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Social context congestion games
SIROCCO'11 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Structural information and communication complexity
How profitable are strategic behaviors in a market?
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
Externalities among advertisers in sponsored search
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Nash equilibria with minimum potential in undirected broadcast games
WALCOM'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Algorithms and computation
Efficiency analysis of load balancing games with and without activation costs
Journal of Scheduling
Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Pairwise cooperations in selfish ring routing for minimax linear latency
Theoretical Computer Science
Theoretical Computer Science
On the Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
Minimizing rosenthal potential in multicast games
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
On bidimensional congestion games
SIROCCO'12 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
On a noncooperative model for wavelength assignment in multifiber optical networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Finding social optima in congestion games with positive externalities
ESA'12 Proceedings of the 20th Annual European conference on Algorithms
Congestion games with capacitated resources
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
The ring design game with fair cost allocation
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal Cost Sharing for Resource Selection Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
NP-hardness of pure Nash equilibrium in Scheduling and Network Design Games
Theoretical Computer Science
Price of stability in polynomial congestion games
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
How many attackers can selfish defenders catch?
Discrete Applied Mathematics
On Nash Equilibria for a Network Creation Game
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Social context congestion games
Theoretical Computer Science
The cost of selfishness for maximizing the minimum load on uniformly related machines
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
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Network design is a fundamental problem for which it is important to understand the effects of strategic behavior. Given a collection of self-interested agents who want to form a network connecting certain endpoints, the set of stable solutions—the Nash equilibria—may look quite different from the centrally enforced optimum. We study the quality of the best Nash equilibrium, and refer to the ratio of its cost to the optimum network cost as the price of stability. The best Nash equilibrium solution has a natural meaning of stability in this context—it is the optimal solution that can be proposed from which no user will defect. We consider the price of stability for network design with respect to one of the most widely studied protocols for network cost allocation, in which the cost of each edge is divided equally between users whose connections make use of it; this fair-division scheme can be derived from the Shapley value and has a number of basic economic motivations. We show that the price of stability for network design with respect to this fair cost allocation is $O(\log k)$, where $k$ is the number of users, and that a good Nash equilibrium can be achieved via best-response dynamics in which users iteratively defect from a starting solution. This establishes that the fair cost allocation protocol is in fact a useful mechanism for inducing strategic behavior to form near-optimal equilibria. We discuss connections to the class of potential games defined by Monderer and Shapley, and extend our results to cases in which users are seeking to balance network design costs with latencies in the constructed network, with stronger results when the network has only delays and no construction costs. We also present bounds on the convergence time of best-response dynamics, and discuss extensions to a weighted game.