Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing Nash equilibria for scheduling on restricted parallel links
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
Convergence time to Nash equilibrium in load balancing
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Fast and compact: a simple class of congestion games
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
SIAM Journal on Computing
Smooth inequalities and equilibrium inefficiency in scheduling games
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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We extend congestion games to the setting where every resource is endowed with a capacity which possibly limits its number of users. From the negative side, we show that a pure Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist in any case and we prove that deciding whether a game possesses a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete. Our positive results state that congestion games with capacities are potential games in the well studied singleton case. Polynomial algorithms that compute these equilibria are also provided.