STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Selfish routing with atomic players
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A network pricing game for selfish traffic
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On nash equilibria for a network creation game
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on FOCS 2001
Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets
Mathematics of Operations Research
A Column-Generation Approach to Line Planning in Public Transport
Transportation Science
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Computers & Mathematics with Applications
Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Improved equilibria via public service advertising
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Homogeneous Interference Game in Wireless Networks
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
Approximation and Online Algorithms
Traffic Networks and Flows over Time
Algorithmics of Large and Complex Networks
Models of Non-atomic Congestion Games --- From Unicast to Multicast Routing
Algorithmics of Large and Complex Networks
Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
Operations Research
Eliciting Coordination with Rebates
Transportation Science
The Impact of Oligopolistic Competition in Networks
Operations Research
Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Theoretical Computer Science
Selfish routing with oblivious users
SIROCCO'07 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Structural information and communication complexity
Nonadaptive selfish routing with online demands
CAAN'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Combinatorial and algorithmic aspects of networking
Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
A network creation game with nonuniform interests
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
Traffic flow condition classification for short sections using single microwave sensor
EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing - Special title on vehicular ad hoc networks
Optimal cost sharing protocols for scheduling games
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Leading dynamics to good behavior
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Competition yields efficiency in load balancing games
Performance Evaluation
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
Braess's paradox, fibonacci numbers, and exponential inapproximability
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
The price of anarchy in selfish multicast routing
CAAN'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Networking
Geometric network design with selfish agents
COCOON'05 Proceedings of the 11th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
The price of anarchy of cournot oligopoly
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the inefficiency of equilibria in congestion games
IPCO'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in atomic splittable congestion games
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Network games with atomic players
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
MFCS'06 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
The efficiency of optimal taxes
CAAN'04 Proceedings of the First international conference on Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Networking
Competitive online multicommodity routing
WAOA'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
Profit loss in differentiated oligopolies
Operations Research Letters
Bounding the inefficiency of Nash equilibria in games with finitely many players
Operations Research Letters
Efficient methods for selfish network design
Theoretical Computer Science
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Stronger Bounds on Braess's Paradox and the Maximum Latency of Selfish Routing
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Generalized Quantity Competition for Multiple Products and Loss of Efficiency
Operations Research
Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
Congestion games with capacitated resources
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Optimal Cost Sharing for Resource Selection Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
On Nash Equilibria for a Network Creation Game
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly, a behavior that is captured by the Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. A Nash equilibrium does not optimize any global criterion per se, and so there is no apparent reason why it should be close to a solution of minimal total travel time, i.e., the system optimum. In this paper, we offer positive results on the efficiency of Nash equilibria in traffic networks. In contrast to prior work, we present results for networks with capacities and for latency functions that are nonconvex, nondifferentiable, and even discontinuous.The inclusion of upper bounds on arc flows has early been recognized as an important means to provide a more accurate description of traffic flows. In this more general model, multiple Nash equilibria may exist and an arbitrary equilibrium does not need to be nearly efficient. Nonetheless, our main result shows that the best equilibrium is as efficient as in the model without capacities. Moreover, this holds true for broader classes of travel cost functions than considered hitherto.