Inefficiency of Nash equilibria
Mathematics of Operations Research
Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Algorithms, games, and the internet
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The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
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Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
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Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
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The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On a Paradox of Traffic Planning
Transportation Science
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On the inefficiency of equilibria in congestion games
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The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands
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The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
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Routing selfish unsplittable traffic
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Atomic congestion games among coalitions
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Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
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Distributed Learning of Wardrop Equilibria
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Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
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Efficiency and stability of Nash equilibria in resource allocation games
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Nonadaptive selfish routing with online demands
CAAN'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Combinatorial and algorithmic aspects of networking
Routing (un-) splittable flow in games with player-specific affine latency functions
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Price of anarchy for polynomial wardrop games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Routing (un-) splittable flow in games with player-specific linear latency functions
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Atomic congestion games among coalitions
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Approximating wardrop equilibria with finitely many agents
DISC'07 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Distributed Computing
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We study network and congestion games with atomic players that can split their flow. This type of games readily applies to competition among freight companies, telecommunication network service providers, intelligent transportation systems and manufacturing with flexible machines. We analyze the worst-case inefficiency of Nash equilibria in those games and conclude that although self-interested agents will not in general achieve a fully efficient solution, the loss is not too large. We show how to compute several bounds for the worst-case inefficiency, which depend on the characteristics of cost functions and the market structure in the game. In addition, we show examples in which market aggregation can adversely impact the aggregated competitors, even though their market power increases. When the market structure is simple enough, this counter-intuitive phenomenon does not arise.