The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands

Authors:
Chi Kin Chau;Kwang Mong Sim
Affiliations:
Department of Information Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China;Department of Information Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Venue:
Operations Research Letters
Year:
2003

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Abstract

By showing that there is an upper bound for the price of anarchy@r(@C) for a non-atomic congestion game @C with only separable cost maps and fixed demands, Roughgarden and Tardos show that the cost of forgoing centralized control is mild. This letter shows that there is an upper bound for @r(@C) in @C for fixed demands with symmetric cost maps. It also shows that there is a weaker bound for @r(@C) in @C with elastic demands.