Inefficiency of Nash equilibria
Mathematics of Operations Research
Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
How unfair is optimal routing?
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - STOC 2002
Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects
Management Science
Self-Interested Routing in Queueing Networks
Management Science
Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
Mathematics of Operations Research
Edge Pricing of Multicommodity Networks for Heterogeneous Selfish Users
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tolls for Heterogeneous Selfish Users in Multicommodity Networks and Generalized Congestion Games
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Selfish routing with atomic players
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The effect of collusion in congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets
Mathematics of Operations Research
The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Equilibria of atomic flow games are not unique
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
The “Price of Anarchy” Under Nonlinear and Asymmetric Costs
Mathematics of Operations Research
Fast, Fair, and Efficient Flows in Networks
Operations Research
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On the inefficiency of equilibria in congestion games
IPCO'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Network games with atomic players
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands
Operations Research Letters
Price of anarchy in non-cooperative load balancing
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
Competition yields efficiency in load balancing games
Performance Evaluation
Price of anarchy in non-cooperative load balancing games
Performance Evaluation
On the existence of pure strategy nash equilibria in integer-splittable weighted congestion games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
SIAM Journal on Computing
The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in atomic splittable congestion games
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
The price of collusion in series-parallel networks
IPCO'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
The effectiveness of stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Coalitions in Nonatomic Network Congestion Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
On a generalized Cournot oligopolistic competition game
Journal of Global Optimization
Hi-index | 0.00 |
In the traffic assignment problem, first proposed by Wardrop in 1952, commuters select the shortest available path to travel from their origins to their destinations. We study a generalization of this problem in which competitors, who may control a nonnegligible fraction of the total flow, ship goods across a network. This type of games, usually referred to as atomic games, readily applies to situations in which the competing freight companies have market power. Other applications include intelligent transportation systems, competition among telecommunication network service providers, and scheduling with flexible machines. Our goal is to determine to what extent these systems can benefit from some form of coordination or regulation. We measure the quality of the outcome of the game without centralized control by computing the worst-case inefficiency of Nash equilibria. The main conclusion is that although self-interested competitors will not achieve a fully efficient solution from the system's point of view, the loss is not too severe. We show how to compute several bounds for the worst-case inefficiency that depend on the characteristics of cost functions and on the market structure in the game. In addition, building upon the work of Catoni and Pallotino, we show examples in which market aggregation (or collusion) adversely impacts the aggregated competitors, even though their market power increases. For example, Nash equilibria of atomic network games may be less efficient than the corresponding Wardrop equilibria. When competitors are completely symmetric, we provide a characterization of the Nash equilibrium using a potential function, and prove that this counterintuitive phenomenon does not arise. Finally, we study a pricing mechanism that elicits more coordination from the players by reducing the worst-case inefficiency of Nash equilibria.