Eliciting Coordination with Rebates
Transportation Science
The Impact of Oligopolistic Competition in Networks
Operations Research
Performance of wireless heterogeneous networks with always-best-connected users
NGI'09 Proceedings of the 5th Euro-NGI conference on Next Generation Internet networks
Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
Price war in heterogeneous wireless networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
The limits of smoothness: a primal-dual framework for price of anarchy bounds
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Operations Research
Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
SIAM Journal on Computing
The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in atomic splittable congestion games
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Interplay between security providers, consumers, and attackers: a weighted congestion game approach
GameSec'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Communications of the ACM
Profit loss in differentiated oligopolies
Operations Research Letters
Stronger Bounds on Braess's Paradox and the Maximum Latency of Selfish Routing
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Generalized Quantity Competition for Multiple Products and Loss of Efficiency
Operations Research
Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
On a generalized Cournot oligopolistic competition game
Journal of Global Optimization
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In this paper we characterize the “price of anarchy,” i.e., the inefficiency between user and system optimal solutions, when costs are nonseparable, asymmetric and nonlinear, generalizing earlier work that has addressed “the price of anarchy” under separable costs. The results in this paper apply primarily to nonatomic games such as the traffic equilibrium problem, but also in competitive multiperiod pricing and competitive supply chain settings. The bounds established in this paper are tight and explicitly account for the degree of asymmetry and nonlinearity of the cost function. We first provide a proof method for problems with a positive definite Jacobian matrix. Subsequently, we use ideas from semidefinite optimization in order to account for problems with a positive semidefinite Jacobian matrix (where the first approach does not apply). This latter connection also provides a different application of semidefinite optimization.