Revenue Management of a Make-to-Stock Queue
Operations Research
Incentives for Quality Through Endogenous Routing
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Managing Service Systems with an Offline Waiting Option and Customer Abandonment
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
The Impact of Oligopolistic Competition in Networks
Operations Research
User equilibria for a parallel queueing system with state dependent routing
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
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We study self-interested routing in stochastic networks, taking into account the discrete stochastic dynamics of such networks. We analyze a two-station multiclass queueing network in which the system manager chooses the scheduling rule and individual customers choose routes in a self-interested manner. We show that this network can be unstable in Nash equilibrium under some scheduling rules. We also design a nontrivial scheduling rule that negates the performance degradation resulting from self-interested routing and achieves a Nash equilibrium with performance comparable to the first-best solution.