Coordination mechanisms for congestion games
ACM SIGACT News
A network pricing game for selfish traffic
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on network algorithms 2005
On selfish routing in internet-like environments
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Taxes for linear atomic congestion games
ESA'06 Proceedings of the 14th conference on Annual European Symposium - Volume 14
The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Designing networks with good equilibria
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Improving the Efficiency of Load Balancing Games through Taxes
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Efficient Methods for Selfish Network Design
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th Internatilonal Collogquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part II
Theoretical Computer Science
The Impact of Oligopolistic Competition in Networks
Operations Research
Performance of wireless heterogeneous networks with always-best-connected users
NGI'09 Proceedings of the 5th Euro-NGI conference on Next Generation Internet networks
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Cost-balancing tolls for atomic network congestion games
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
Taxes for linear atomic congestion games
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
On the existence of optimal taxes for network congestion games with heterogeneous users
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
SIAM Journal on Computing
Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
The contribution of game theory to complex systems
PCI'05 Proceedings of the 10th Panhellenic conference on Advances in Informatics
The price of anarchy in selfish multicast routing
CAAN'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Networking
Edge pricing of multicommodity networks for selfish users with elastic demands
COCOON'06 Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
The efficiency of optimal taxes
CAAN'04 Proceedings of the First international conference on Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Networking
Interplay between security providers, consumers, and attackers: a weighted congestion game approach
GameSec'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
Existence and computation of optimal tolls in multiclass network equilibrium problems
Operations Research Letters
Efficient methods for selfish network design
Theoretical Computer Science
The effectiveness of stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We examine how the selfish behavior of heterogeneous users in a network can be regulated through economic disincentives, i.e., through the introduction of appropriate taxation. One wants to impose taxes on the edges so that any traffic equalibrium reached by the selfish users who are conscious of both the travel latencies and the taxes will minimize the social cost, i.e., will minimize the total latency. We generalize previous results of Cole, Dodis and Roughgarden that held for a single origin-destination pair to the multicommodity setting. Our approach, which could be of independent interest, is based on the formulation of traffic equilibria as a nonlinear complementarity problem by Aashtiani and Magnanti [1]. We extend this formulation so that each of its solutions will give us a set of taxes that forces the network users to conform, at equilibrium, to a certain prescribed routing. We use the special nature of the prescribed minimum-latency flow in order to reduce the difficult nonlinear complementary formulation to a pair of primal-dual linear programs. LP duality is then enough to derive our results.