Coordination mechanisms for congestion games

  • Authors:
  • Marek Chrobak;Elias Koutsoupias

  • Affiliations:
  • University of California, Riverside;University of Athens

  • Venue:
  • ACM SIGACT News
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

Recently there has been a lot of interest in problems at the intersection of Game Theory, Economics, and Computer Science. For example, there are interesting developments concerning algorithms for equilibria and cost sharing, algorithmic mechanism design, and the efficiency of systems with selfish users [25]. In this note, I will focus on the last area and in particular on the price of anarchy of task allocation, selfish routing, and congestion games. I will discuss the issues of this area, mention the central results, and suggest some open problems, some of them close in spirit to competitive analysis.