Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Stackelberg scheduling strategies
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Tolls for Heterogeneous Selfish Users in Multicommodity Networks and Generalized Congestion Games
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Coordination mechanisms for congestion games
ACM SIGACT News
Algorithmic Game Theory
(Almost) optimal coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Theoretical Computer Science
Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
SIAM Journal on Computing
Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
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We study coordination mechanisms for scheduling nselfish tasks on midentical parallel machines and we focus on the price of anarchy of non-preemptive coordination mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms whose local policies do not delay or preempt tasks. We prove that the price of anarchy of every non-preemptive coordination mechanism for m 2 is $\Omega(\frac{\log \log m}{\log \log \log m})$, while for m= 2, we prove a $\frac{7}{6}$ lower bound. Our lower bounds indicate that it is impossible to produce a non-preemptive coordination mechanism that improves on the currently best known price of anarchy for identical machine scheduling, which is $\frac{4}{3}-\frac{1}{3m}$.