Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Designing Networks for Selfish Users is Hard
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Edge Pricing of Multicommodity Networks for Heterogeneous Selfish Users
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tolls for Heterogeneous Selfish Users in Multicommodity Networks and Generalized Congestion Games
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on network algorithms 2005
Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
Theoretical Computer Science
Algorithmic Game Theory
(Almost) optimal coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Non-preemptive Coordination Mechanisms for Identical Machine Scheduling Games
SIROCCO '08 Proceedings of the 15th international colloquium on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Theoretical Computer Science
On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
Journal of Scheduling
Inner product spaces for MinSum coordination mechanisms
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
The efficiency of optimal taxes
CAAN'04 Proceedings of the First international conference on Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Networking
Computer Science Review
Scheduling selfish tasks: about the performance of truthful algorithms
COCOON'07 Proceedings of the 13th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
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We reconsider the well-studied Selfish Routing game with affine latency functions. The Price of Anarchy for this class of games takes maximum value 4/3; this maximum is attained already for a simple network of two parallel links, known as Pigou's network. We improve upon the value 4/3 by means of Coordination Mechanisms. We increase the latency functions of the edges in the network, i.e., if le(x) is the latency function of an edge e, we replace it by le(x) with le(x) ≤ le(x) for all x. Then an adversary fixes a demand rate as input. The engineered Price of Anarchy of the mechanism is defined as the worst-case ratio of the Nash social cost in the modified network over the optimal social cost in the original network. Formally, if CN(r) denotes the cost of the worst Nash flow in the modified network for rate r and Copt(r) denotes the cost of the optimal flow in the original network for the same rate then ePoA = maxr≥0CN(r)/Copt(r). We first exhibit a simple coordination mechanism that achieves for any network of parallel links an engineered Price of Anarchy strictly less than 4/3. For the case of two parallel links our basic mechanism gives 5/4 = 1.25. Then, for the case of two parallel links, we describe an optimal mechanism; its engineered Price of Anarchy lies between 1.191 and 1.192.