Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Selfish traffic allocation for server farms
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Equilibria in topology control games for ad hoc networks
DIALM-POMC '03 Proceedings of the 2003 joint workshop on Foundations of mobile computing
Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting
ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - STOC 2002
A stronger bound on Braess's Paradox
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The maximum latency of selfish routing
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
How to route and tax selfish unsplittable traffic
Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Coordination mechanisms for congestion games
ACM SIGACT News
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Inefficiency in provisioning interconnected communication networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Low-Cost Routing in Selfish and Rational Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Braess's paradox in large random graphs
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on network algorithms 2005
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Equilibria in topology control games for ad hoc networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
PDCN'06 Proceedings of the 24th IASTED international conference on Parallel and distributed computing and networks
Tradeoffs in worst-case equilibria
Theoretical Computer Science - Approximation and online algorithms
Guided local search as a network planning algorithm that incorporates uncertain traffic demands
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Routing selfish unsplittable traffic
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
End-to-end link power control in optical networks using Nash bargaining solution
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Performance evaluation methodologies and tools
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Routing game in hybrid wireless mesh networks with selfish mesh clients
International Journal of Autonomous and Adaptive Communications Systems
Power in threshold network flow games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Theoretical Computer Science
Theoretical Computer Science
The hardness of selective network design for bottleneck routing games
TAMC'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Theory and applications of models of computation
On the packing of selfish items
IPDPS'06 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Parallel and distributed processing
Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
Braess's paradox, fibonacci numbers, and exponential inapproximability
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
The hardness of network design for unsplittable flow with selfish users
WAOA'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
A selfish non-atomic routing algorithm based on game theory
ICNC'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Advances in Natural Computation - Volume Part III
Experimental results for stackelberg scheduling strategies
WEA'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Experimental and Efficient Algorithms
Selfish splittable flows and NP-completeness
Computer Science Review
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e consider a directed network in which every edge possesses a latency function specifying the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion. Selfish, noncooperativeagents constitute the network traffic and wish to travel from a source s to a sink t as quickly as possible. Since the route chosen by one network user affects the congestion (and hence the latency) experienced by others, we model the problem as a noncooperative game. Assuming each agent controls only a negligible portion of the overall traffic, Nash equilibria in this noncooperative game correspond to s-t flows in which all flow paths have equal latency.A natural measure for the performance of a network used by selfish agents is the common latency experienced by each user in a Nash equilibrium. It is a counterintuitive but well-knownfact that removing edges from a network may improve its performance; the most famous example of this phenomenon is the so-called Braess's Paradox. This fact motivates the following network design problem: given such a network, which edges should be removed to obtain the best possible flow at Nash equilibrium? Equivalently, given a large network of candidate edges to be built, which subnetwork will exhibit the best performance when used selfishly?We give optimal inapproximability results and approximation algorithms for several network design problems of this type. For example, we prove that for networks with n nodes and continuous, nondecreasing latency functions, there is no approximation algorithm for this problem with approximation ratio less than n/2 (unless P = NP). We also prove this hardness result to be best possible by exhibiting an n/2-approximation algorithm. For networks in which the latency of each edge is a linear function of the congestion, we prove that there is no (\frac{4}{3} - \varepsilon)-approximation algorithm for the problem (for any \varepsilon 0, unless P = NP); the existence of a \frac{4}{3}-approximation algorithm follows easily from existing work, proving this hardness result sharp.Moreover, we prove that an optimal approximation algorithm for these problems is what we call the trivial algorithm: given a network of candidate edges, build the entire network. Roughly, this result implies that the presence of harmful extra edges in a network (a phenomenon that can lead to extremely poor performance in large networks with general latency functions) is impossible to detect efficiently.