Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Stackelberg scheduling strategies
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc WANs
MobiHoc '00 Proceedings of the 1st ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Finding the most vital node of a shortest path
Theoretical Computer Science - Computing and combinatorics
A charging and rewarding scheme for packet forwarding in multi-hop cellular networks
Proceedings of the 4th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Designing Networks for Selfish Users is Hard
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Stimulating cooperation in self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
Self organization in mobile ad hoc networks: the approach of Terminodes
IEEE Communications Magazine
On designing collusion-resistant routing schemes for non-cooperative wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 13th annual ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Hidden information and actions in multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Routing game in hybrid wireless mesh networks with selfish mesh clients
International Journal of Autonomous and Adaptive Communications Systems
A Multi-agents Contractual Approach to Incentive Provision in Non-cooperative Networks
OTM '08 Proceedings of the OTM 2008 Confederated International Conferences, CoopIS, DOA, GADA, IS, and ODBASE 2008. Part I on On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems:
On eliminating packet droppers in MANET: A modular solution
Ad Hoc Networks
GSN '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on GeoSensor Networks
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
A collusion-resistant routing scheme for noncooperative wireless ad hoc networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Truthful least-priced-path routing in opportunistic spectrum access networks
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
A novel acknowledgment-based approach against collude attacks in MANET
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
CRISP: collusion-resistant incentive-compatible routing and forwarding in opportunistic networks
Proceedings of the 15th ACM international conference on Modeling, analysis and simulation of wireless and mobile systems
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Numerous routing protocols have been proposed for wireless networks. A common assumption made by the majority of these protocols is that each wireless node will follow the prescribed protocol without any deviation. This may not be true in practice since wireless nodes could be owned by users who perform in their own interests. We then have to design routing protocols that still work properly even for networks composed of selfish nodes. In this paper, we propose a unicast routing protocol to address this issue under the assumption that all networking nodes are rational. Here, a node is rational if it always chooses a strategy that maximizes its benefit. We assume that each node has a privately known cost of relaying a unit of data for other nodes. In our protocol, each wireless node has to declare a cost for forwarding a unit of data. When a node wants to send data to the access point, it first computes the least cost path to the access point and then computes a payment to each node on this path. We present a pricing mechanism such that the profit of each relay node is maximized when it declares its true cost. We also give a time optimal method to compute the payment in a centralized manner. We then discuss in detail how to implement the routing protocol in the distributed manner. We conduct extensive simulations to study the ratio of the total payment over the total cost incurred by all relay nodes. We find that this ratio is small in practice. Our protocol works when the wireless nodes will not collude and we show that no truthful mechanism can avoid the collusion of any pair of two nodes. We also give a truthful mechanism when a node only colludes with its neighbors.