A framework for MAC protocol misbehavior detection in wireless networks
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Wireless security
Selfish MAC Layer Misbehavior in Wireless Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Low-Cost Routing in Selfish and Rational Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
The COMMIT Protocol for Truthful and Cost-Efficient Routing in Ad Hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Game Theoretic Packet Scheduling to Combat Non-Cooperativeness in Wireless Mesh Networks
ICDCSW '08 Proceedings of the 2008 The 28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops
Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks: Thwarting Malicious and Selfish Behavior in the Age of Ubiquitous Computing
Fine-grained I/O access control of the mobile devices based on the Xen architecture
Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
File transmission over wireless fast fading downlink
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
A game-theoretic approach to energy-efficient power control in multicarrier CDMA systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Spectrum sharing for unlicensed bands
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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In many practical scenarios, wireless devices are autonomous and thus, may exhibit non-cooperative behaviors due to self-interests. For instance, a wireless cellular device may be programmed to report bogus channel information to gain resource allocation advantages. Such non-cooperative behaviors are highly probable as the device's software can be modified by the user. In this paper, we first analyze the impact of these rationally selfish behaviors on the performance of packet scheduling algorithms in time-slotted wireless networks. Using a mixed strategy game model, we show that the traditional maximum rate packet scheduling algorithm can cause non-cooperative devices to converge to highly inefficient Nash equilibria, in which the wireless channel resources are significantly wasted. By using a repeated game to enforce cooperation, we further propose a novel game theoretic algorithm that can lead to an efficient equilibrium.