Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the k-Splittable Flow Problem
ESA '02 Proceedings of the 10th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms
Designing Networks for Selfish Users is Hard
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
The hardness of network design for unsplittable flow with selfish users
WAOA'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
On the hardness of network design for bottleneck routing games
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
On the hardness of network design for bottleneck routing games
Theoretical Computer Science
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In this paper, motivated by the work of Azar et al. [3] we consider selective network design on bottleneck routing games. Assuming P ≠ NP we achieve the following results. For the unsplittable bottleneck games the trivial algorithm is a best possible approximation algorithm. For the k-splittable unweighted bottleneck games it is NP-hard to compute a best pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover no polynomial time algorithms can have a constant approximation ratio if the edge latency functions are continuous and non-decreasing.